In the second edition of this groundbreaking text in non-Western philosophy, sixteen experts introduce some of the great philosophical traditions in the world. The essays unveil exciting, sophisticated philosophical traditions that are too often neglected in the western world. The contributors include the leading scholars in their fields, but they write for students coming to these concepts for the first time. Building on revisions and updates to the original, this new edition also considers three philosophical traditions for the first time—Jewish, (...) Buddhist, and South Pacific philosophy. (shrink)

Tom Phillips' painting for the dustjacket of the hardback edition of Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals depicts a faintly translucent, darkly-coloured, multi-layered lattice of letters, in which each character abuts directly upon others above, below and beside it, each overwrites or is overwritten by others of varying dimensions, but none is immediately decipherable as part of a word; and at the centre of this array is a geometrically precise, illuminated circle—perhaps emanating from a light located behind or under (...) the layers of letters, perhaps from one directed at them from above. This image is open to many interpretations. It could represent the sun from Plato's myth of the cave shining through the dialogue in which he presents it ; it could also represent the light of Miss Murdoch's attention playing over the palimpsest of texts that make up the Western tradition of metaphysical thought. But for anyone encountering it upon closing the book after a first reading, it may also seem very precisely to crystallize one's initial impression of that text. (shrink)

As a conscientious moral agent, a judge in a court of law often finds herself in a difficult position. She is confident that the law requires a certain result in the case before her, but she is at least as confident that this legally required result is unjust or otherwise morally objectionable. Consider some examples of cases in which a reasonable judge might consider herself to be in this position: ▪ The law of landlord and tenant can require a judge (...) to evict an impoverished, elderly widow from her apartment for missing rent payments.1 ▪ A student in a poor school district sues his state for providing a much lower caliber of education than students receive in wealthier districts. Binding legal precedent requires the judge to dismiss the student’s lawsuit. ▪ Binding precedents construing the Fourth Amendment require judges to exclude evidence obtained without a search warrant. As a result, a child molester is acquitted, and, predictably, strikes again. (shrink)

When judges decide cases in courts of law, are they ethically obligated to apply the law correctly? Many people who think about legal systems believe so. The conviction that judges are “bound” by the law is common among lawyers, judges, legal scholars, and members of the general public. One of the most severe accusations one can make against a public official is that she has deviated from the law in her official capacity. The principle of judicial fidelity figures centrally in (...) one of the most celebrated Western political values: the rule of law. This is an ideal which some Western powers, notably the United States, aspire to export on a global scale. The principle of judicial fidelity implies many basic norms of adjudication. These vary from one legal system to another, but in Anglo-American systems they include the following: trial judges must take all admissible evidence into account; judges must follow recognized sources of law, such as constitutions, legislation, and common-law rules; inferior courts must follow superior court rulings on matters of law; courts should give at least substantial weight even to “horizontal” precedent; et cetera. Limits of Legality is a scholarly monograph, in progress, that advances our understanding of the principle of judicial fidelity and defends a refined and unorthodox version of it. The book draws on my background as both a lawyer and a philosopher, addressing issues at the intersection of legal philosophy and ethical theory. It breaks new ground in the normative theory of adjudication – the branch of legal philosophy that concerns how judges in courts of law should decide cases. Mine is one of the first projects to apply the resources of contemporary normative ethics to central questions concerning the rule of law and judicial obligation. I model the normative presuppositions of existing theories of the rule of law in terms that take into account developments in ethical theory over the past two decades.. (shrink)

Several writers have argued recently that optimal rules of law authorize morally suboptimal decisions in certain cases.1 Larry Alexander calls these “gap cases.”2 Should judges in gap cases defer to legal rules or deviate from them? Philosophers known as “formalists” favor deference, “particularists” favor deviation.

In the State of Bernstein, operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license is a misdemeanor, punishable by permanent loss of one’s license. Officer Krupke arrests everyone who does this, as Tony has. But Tony says, “Gee, Officer Krupke, can’t you bend the rules? I went to your high school, you know.” Tony’s using a euphemism. He’s really asking Krupke to break the rules. Is there, however, a non-euphemistic way to bend a rule of law, without breaking it? More precisely, (...) can we ever bend a rule while still applying it, in some sense, or is this just doubletalk? Consider the case of Maria, whose driver’s license has also been suspended. Maria lives with her mother in a remote area, twenty miles from the nearest doctor. Maria’s mother comes down with a fever of one hundred two. It’s not life-threatening, but Maria wants to spare her mother suffering and hasten recovery, so she drives to the hospital herself, rather than waiting for an ambulance to make the trip out and back. Unfortunately for Maria, the statute contains no applicable exception. I stipulate that this statute is not unjust or otherwise defective, as written. Suppose there are conclusive reasons for legislators not to complicate the statute with exceptions broad enough to cover cases such as Maria’s. Writing such exceptions would encourage sub-optimal misapplication of the exception by judges and sub-optimal misconduct by legal subjects who would anticipate judicial misapplication of the statutory exception. Nevertheless, most will agree that Maria has strong reasons to act as she does. Rare is the writer who insists that rules of law trump all other reasons that bear on legal subjects. Some will insist that we give Maria’s mother a condition more life-threatening before they’ll assent. (shrink)

According to the standard positivist picture of law, each legal system contains a master rule that specifies criteria of legality for primary rules.1 A central debate in legal philosophy during the past twenty-five years has concerned the content of the master rule. Exclusive positivists insist that the master rule can only make reference to social facts or sources: “pedigree” criteria.2 As Ronald Dworkin emphasizes, however, some rulings can’t be justified exclusively by reference to pedigreed legal norms.3 Judges sometimes exercise.

Programmatic concepts have elements that point in a valued direction or name a desired goal. We provide a detailed analysis of the nature of programmatic concepts and cite examples of the programmatic elements found in conceptions of scientific literacy. Next we describe what values underlie these elements and what theories of value might be brought to bear in assessing them. We present an analysis of approximately 70 conceptions of scientific literacy found in the literature since the year 2000. We identify (...) the goals that each of these conceptions of scientific literacy implies and uncover the programmatic elements that are used to justify these goals. Our purpose is to present a sufficiently wide range of views to have a good representation of goals and programmatic elements. Third, we point to a number of pitfalls in any attempt to make preferential selections among the programmatic elements of conceptions of scientific literacy. (shrink)

A compelling investigation into one of the most coveted and cherished ideals, "Wisdom" also chronicles the efforts of modern science to penetrate the mysterious nature of this timeless virtue.

This paper asks whether geographically localised, or ‘hyperlocal’, uses of Twitter succeed in creating peer-to-peer neighbourhood networks or simply act as broadcast media at a reduced scale. Literature drawn from the smart cities discourse and from a UK research project into hyperlocal media, respectively, take on these two opposing interpretations. Evidence gathered in the case study presented here is consistent with the latter, and on this basis we criticise the notion that hyperlocal social media can be seen as a community (...) in itself. We demonstrate this by creating a network map of Twitter followers of a popular hyperlocal blog in Brockley, southeast London. We describe various attributes of this network including its average degree and clustering coefficient to suggest that a small and highly connected cluster of visible local entities such as businesses form a clique at the centre of this network, with individual residents following these but not one another. We then plot the locations of these entities and demonstrate that sub-communities in the network are formed due to close geographical proximity between smaller sets of businesses. These observations are illustrated with qualitative evidence from interviews with users who suggest instead that rather than being connected to one another they benefit from what has been described as ‘neighbourhood storytelling’. Despite the limitations of working with Twitter data, we propose that this multi-modal approach offers a valuable way to investigate the experience of using social media as a communication tool in urban neighbourhoods. (shrink)

In this book, Phillips gives an overview of the contribution of Nyaya--the classical Indian school that defends an externalist position about knowledge as well as an internalist position about justification. Nyaya literature extends almost two thousand years and comprises hundreds of texts, and in this book, Phillips presents a useful overview of the under-studied system of thought. For the philosopher rather than the scholar of Sanskrit, the book makes a whole range of Nyaya positions and arguments accessible to (...) students of epistemology who are unfamiliar with classical Indian systems. (shrink)

This paper draws on classical theories of wisdom to explore the organisational impact of nurses on Australian general practice. Between 2004 and 2008, numbers of general practice nurses doubled, the most rapid influx of nurses into any Australian workplace over the decade. Using data from the Australian General Practice Nurses Study, we argue that nurses had a positive impact because they introduced techne at the organisational level and amplified phronesis in clinical activities. In its Hippocratic formulation, techne refers to a (...) field of definable knowledge, which is purposeful and useful and requires mastery of rational principles. Nursing, with its focus on system and accountability, brought techne out of the GP’s consulting room and into the general practice as a whole. Nurses also exemplify phronesis, an Aristotelian virtue connoting a reasoned and honourable capacity to make judgements: the practical wisdom that defines the interaction between clinician and patient in general practice. At a time of significant GP shortage, doctors and nurses began to collaborate around their more complex and time-consuming patients, leading to a deepening of phronesis in the workplace. By bringing techne to bear on the organisation, and complementing and enhancing phronesis, nurses propel organisational wisdom in general practices. (shrink)

Often translated simply as "logic," the Sanskrit word _nyāya_ means "rule of reasoning" or "method of reasoning." Texts from the school of classical Indian philosophy that bears this name are concerned with cognition, reasoning, and the norms that govern rational debate. This translation of selections from the early school of Nyāya focuses on its foundational text, the _Nyāya-sūtra_, with excerpts from the early commentaries. It will be welcomed by specialists and non-specialists alike seeking an accessible text that both represents some (...) of the best of Indian philosophical thought and can be integrated into courses on Indian philosophy, religion, and intellectual culture. (shrink)

Recently, Jonardan Ganeri reviewed the collaborative translation of the first chapter of Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi by Stephen H. Phillips and N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya (Ganeri 2007). The review is quite favorable, and we have no desire to dispute his kind words. Ganeri does, however, put forth an argument in opposition to a fundamental line of interpretation given by Phillips and Ramanuja Tatacharya about the nature of pramāṇa, knowledge sources, as understood by Gaṅgeśa and, for that matter, Nyāya tradition. (...) This response is meant to answer the argument and reassert an understanding of pramāṇa as factive, that is, as knowledge sources that are inerrant. We argue that this is the best reading of Gaṅgeśa himself .. (shrink)

For serious yoga practitioners curious to know the ancient origins of the art, Stephen Phillips, a professional philosopher and sanskritist with a long-standing personal practice, lays out the philosophies of action, knowledge, and devotion as well as the processes of meditation, reasoning, and self-analysis that formed the basis of yoga in ancient and classical India and continue to shape it today. In discussing yoga's fundamental commitments, Phillips explores traditional teachings of hatha yoga, karma yoga, _bhakti_ yoga, and (...) tantra, and shows how such core concepts as self-monitoring consciousness, karma, nonharmfulness, reincarnation, and the powers of consciousness relate to modern practice. He outlines values implicit in _bhakti_ yoga and the tantric yoga of beauty and art and explains the occult psychologies of _koshas_, _skandhas_, and _chakras_. His book incorporates original translations from the early Upanishads, the _Bhagavad Gita_, the _Yoga Sutra_, the _Hatha Yoga Pradipika_, and seminal tantric writings of the tenth-century Kashmiri Shaivite, Abhinava Gupta. A glossary defining more than three hundred technical terms and an extensive bibliography offer further help to nonscholars. A remarkable exploration of yoga's conceptual legacy, _Yoga, Karma, and Rebirth_ crystallizes ideas about self and reality that unite the many incarnations of yoga. (shrink)

This paper is taken from a long section of the _Tattva-cintā-maṇi_ by Gaṅgeśa that is devoted to proving the existence of—to use an inadequate word—“God” in a somewhat minimalist sense. The _īśvara_, the “Lord,” is for Gaṅgeśa, following Nyāya predecessors, a divine agent, a self, responsible for much, not all, of the order in the world. Unseen Force, _adṛṣṭa_, which is in effect _karman_ made by human action, is also a powerful agent as well as things’ intrinsic natures. Moreover, ordinary (...) selves, atoms, ether, and universals are uncreated. But the _īśvara_ brings about just desert in reincarnation in actualizing Unseen Force, and is responsible for a broad swathe of what some see as accidental arrangements as well as the forming of the macro elements from eternal, naturally _dis_joined atoms. Thus the cosmos in its general existence and structure is viewed in Nyāya as the work of the Lord. Gaṅgeśa’s argument runs: Earth and the like [_a_ (_pakṣa_) = earth and the like (_kṣity-ādi_)] have a conscious agent as a cause [S (_sādhya_) = having an agential cause (_sakartṛkatva_) (S_a_)], _since_ they are effects [H (_sādhana_) = being an effect [(_kāryatva_) (H_a_)], like a pot [_b_ (_dṛṣṭānta_) = a pot (H_b_,S_b_)]. And so the _vyāpti_ rule is: [H → S (_vyāpti_)] Whatever is an effect has an agential cause. For earth and the like, it is reasoned that only an omniscient _īśvara_ could be that cause. The argument was a target of Buddhists who pointed to counterexamples such as growing grass. Growing grass exhibits the prover property, being-an-effect, but not the property to be proved, having-an-agential-cause. The long section is dominated by Gaṅgeśa’s rebutting this and other potential defeaters, in particular, the _upādhi_, having-a-living-body (God does not have a living body but all the agential causes with which we are familiar do), along with a counterinference (_sat-pratipakṣa_), I_a_ & (x)(Ix → ¬Sx), where I = not-produced-by-an-agent-with-a-body. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This essay attempts to provide a useful research agenda for researchers in both strategic managementandbusiness ethics. We motivate this agenda by suggesting that the two fields started with similar interests, diverged, and are beginning to converge again. We then identify several streams that hold particular promise for developing our understanding of the relationship between strategy and ethics: stakeholder theory, managerial discretion, behavioral strategy, strategy as practice, and environmental sustainability.

Study of Upādhiprakaraṇa of Gaṅgeśa, 13th cent., treatise on Navya Nyāya philosophy; includes text and translataion.

Counterinference is one of five kinds of pseudo-prover (similar to fallacy in Western logic) recognized in the Nyaaya school. Typically in counterinference while one side seeks to prove the thesis that a probandum belongs to an inferential subject because an inferential mark pervaded by the probandum belongs to that subject, an opponent challenges that by arguing that the probandum does not belong to the inferential subject because another inferential mark pervaded by absence (negation) of the probandum belongs to that subject. (...) A common example is: sound is eternal, since it is audible and audibility is pervaded by eternality (i.e. all that is audible is eternal, like sound-ness, the common property of all sound particulars); but sound is non-eternal, since it is originated (by clapping hands, etc.) and all that is originated is non-eternal, like a pot, etc. Critics from other philosophical schools have objected that counterinference is not an additional kind of pseudo-prover. Since it is impossible for an inferential subject both to have and not to have a probandum, either at least one of the inferential marks does not belong to the inferential subject (the fallacy of being unestablished) or at least one of the inferential marks lacks pervasion (the fallacy of deviation) and, accordingly, counterinference should be subsumed under those fallacies. Nyaaya philosophers have responded by pointing out that the formal structure of counterinference is different from that of the other fallacies: in counterinference we have two different inferential marks but not in the other candidates. The epistemic result of counterinference is also different from that of the other fallacies mentioned, it is argued further. Moreover, it is contended (against a Nyaaya faction) that the epistemic result is not doubt as specifically understood in Nyaaya but desire to know the truth about the chosen inferential mark and the probandum. Accordingly, counterinference may be explained as that which provides the ground for inquiring what is the truth about the original inferential mark and its probandum due to presentation of an inferential assimilation (paraamarsha) that contradicts the original inferential assimilation. The discussion yields also a broader normative principle that contradiction or counterproof provides the epistemic ground for further inquiry even if there is proof. The selection is from the Tattva-cintaa-maNi, the canonical Navya-Nyaaya work of GaMgesha (14th century CE?). The selection is from a large work and presupposes some things explained elsewhere in the text. Further, though written with great precision the work paradoxically belongs to the old Indian philosophical oral tradition in which a beginner is expected to read it with the help of additional information supplied by an expert. Hence paying close attention to what is implied in the context and supplementing certain ideas is necessary for interpretation and understanding. (shrink)

The present work is a translation of The Perception Chapter of Jewel of Reflection on the Truth, a foundational text by the great fourteenth-century Indian logician Gangesa Upadhyaya. The authors' introduction and running commentary to the translation provide essential theoretical and historical background, contextualization, analysis, and comparison of Nyaya and Western traditions. Includes a detailed glossary and index. Published by American Institute of Buddhist Studies (AIBS).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception:A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyāya's Nirvikalpaka PratyakṣaStephen H. PhillipsIn the lead article of the fiftieth anniversary issue of Philosophy East and West (January 2000), Arindam Chakrabarti elaborates seven reasons why Nyāya should jettison "indeterminate perception" and view all perception as determinate, that is to say, as having an entity (a) as qualified by a qualifier (F) as object (Fa). In his notes, (...) Chakrabarti invites a reply "so that," as he says, "I may know why immaculate perception is needed by Nyāya after all." The following is a response that shows not so much why indeterminate perception is needed by Nyāya but why it is identified as a causal factor necessary to the arising of some (not all) determinate perception defined as "perception of an entity as qualified." Here I follow Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the fourteenth-century founder (with the help of a few less well known predecessors and contemporaries) of "New Logic," Navya Nyāya. Gaṅgeśa devotes an entire section (about one eighteenth) of the perception chapter of his monumental Tattvacintāmaṇi (Jewel of Reflection about Epistemology) to nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa,1 and he is a chief target of Chakrabarti's chastisement.2Now, first of all, I want to follow Gaṅgeśa's ground rules. The Naiyāyika is not concerned with strategies about how to look good in debates (with Buddhists or anyone else). His attitude is truth-seeking, not eristic, and thus no reply will be given to Chakrabarti's agonizing about how best to show ourselves in controversies with (in particular, Buddhist) adversaries (and Wilfrid Sellars). Gaṅgeśa's reflections are vāda—and the section is rightly titled nirvikalpaka-vāda, vāda being "inquiries among friends"—directed to uncovering real causal factors, not to winning a debate or countering sophisms. Deception, or counter-deception, is sometimes appropriate—for instance, to protect a student or other judge from fallacies advanced by people of bad character. But not here. So I will lay out Gaṅgeśa's argument for identifying nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa, and then run through Chakrabarti's list of reasons for rejecting it with an eye to the objection's salience to Gaṅgeśa's project. In other words, Chakrabarti's objections will be taken up with an eye to the truth as it appears to a Naiyāyika, not with an eye to how our team should best present itself to outsiders. I have little to say about Chakrabarti's complaints about appearances—in fact, I find them delightful. Don't let him fool you. There's no greater Naiyāyika enthusiast than Chakrabarti himself, and he knows how to distill a controversy to show the wisdom [End Page 104] of Nyāya in contrast to revealing a deficiency, as he appears to be doing here. He does this to make us think broadly about Nyāya in a contemporary context. And at the end I join him in making some very general comments about Nyāya's realism. First, Gaṅgeśa's argument and a rebuttal of Chakrabarti's seven reasons from Gaṅgeśa's point of view.There is no direct, apperceptive evidence for nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa; rather, it is posited by force of the following inference as the first step of a two-step argument. "The perceptual cognition, 'A cow' (for example), is generated by a cognition of the qualifier, since it is a cognition of an entity as qualified (by that qualifier appearing), like an inference." The second step takes a person's first perception of an individual (Bessie, let us say) as a cow (i.e., as having some such property) as the perceptual cognition figuring as the inference's subject (or pakṣa) such that the cognizer's memory not informed by previous cow experience could not possibly provide the qualifier, cowhood. The qualifier has to be available, and the best candidate seems to be its perception in the raw, a qualifier (cowhood), that is to say, not (as some are wont to misinterpret the point... (shrink)

Using a dataset of corporate philanthropic gifts of $1 million or more, we examine the influence of corporate donors on the performance of recipient non-profit organizations. We find that corporate donors positively influence NPO performance, specifically in the form of higher revenues per employee, program ratios, and fundraising returns. We find little evidence that large foundation or individual donors similarly enhance organizational performance. In additional analysis, we find that large corporate donations matter when the corporation is more likely to have (...) influence over the recipient NPO. These findings suggest that corporate donors provide the monitoring and expertise needed to enhance organizational performance beyond simply providing funding to NPOs. Our results are robust to a two-stage model and propensity score matching to address endogeneity concerns. While prior research has examined the effect of corporate philanthropy on donor organization performance, we contribute to the literature by examining whether corporate philanthropy also improves recipient organization performance. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Perceiving Particulars Blindly:Remarks on a Nyāya-Buddhist ControversyStephen H. PhillipsIntroductionThe discussion by Mark Siderits in this issue—"Perceiving Particulars"—and two pieces by Monima Chadha—the first her article "Perceptual Cognition: A Nyāya-Kantian Approach" (Chadha 2001) and the second her reply to Siderits in this issue—have taught me much.1 I have little to add beyond agreeing on the whole with Siderits and making a few tweaks concerning Nyāya. Chadha astutely captures the insight (...) of Gaṅgeśa, the fourteenth-century Naiyāyika cited by her (and by Siderits): indeterminate perception does not have a "particular as such" as its object (viṣaya), but only, as she says, a non-particular individual such as a universal or another qualifier that is in principle recurrent (recurrent out in the world), perceivable [End Page 389] again, and thus expressible by a (repeatable) word. Nevertheless, the holism of Wilfred Sellars and Kant and the attack on the "given" are not in the spirit of the Nyāya approach to epistemology, which is thoroughly externalist, as Siderits suggests. In several places (one presented below), Gaṅgeśa shows us controversy within Nyāya about indeterminate perception, including a rival Naiyāyika opinion that bare particulars are indeterminately grasped. This is not his own view, which is that positing indeterminate perception of qualifiers and not also of qualificanda is all that we need. But all in all the issue is not such a big deal, since perception does generate determinate knowledge of particulars, although these are always at least barely clothed.The notion of a "bare particular"—that is, the qualificandum thought about as distinct from all of its qualifiers—is an abstraction from what we directly perceive. We know it only by inference (specifically, by an inference of the sāmānyato dṘṣṭa type). Indeterminate perception is also known only by inference. Even in Navya Nyāya, the big deal is what is known determinately in perception, which is the principal way we know anything (the jyeṣṭa pramāṇa). And, clearly, determinate perceptual awareness is often of a particular—"The pot is blue" and "That's a pot," for instance. The particular known—indeed, the bare particular—is an intrinsic part of the viṣayatā, "intentionality," which is the relation between the knowing cognition and the world known.2Contrary to what Chadha says in her first article, "seeing as" does not require mental construction, according to Nyāya. The property bearer (dharmin = viśeṣya, "qualificandum") is grasped by the sense organ and is known directly in determinate perception as well as the qualifier and the qualificative relation. In two subtypes of perceptual awareness, (a) recurrent experience and (b) the recognition of something perceived previously, Chadha is right: the mind is operative, responsive to the firing of saṃskāra, "memory impressions," and fusing previous perceptual data into a current perceiving: (a) "A cow," "Another," "Another," and (b) "This is that Devadatta (I saw yesterday)." But hardly all cases of determinate perception require the mind (in Chadha's sense). The object known is minimally a complex of a property bearer (the particular as such), property, and an ontological relation tying them up, a-inherence-pothood (where "a" designates the pot as bare particular, "the subject of qualification"); the determinate perception, "That's a pot," makes that particular as qualified known.So, you say, I am agreeing with Chadha, whose argument is directed against the particular as such being known (either determinately or indeterminately) in perception. Yes, but the point is that the particular is known in perception; the particular-as-such is known in perception, although it would be fantasy to think it even possible that we could ever see her, this property bearer, well, not so much bare as disembodied. A rough analogy is seeing a door. We say we "see the door" when we see only one side of it, not the back. We see the thing as a door without grasping everything about the door that its being a door entails.Indeterminate perception of qualifiers is a controversial posit that does various work for Gaṅgeśa and other... (shrink)

This book is the first philosophy of religion anthology to offer a broad survey of classical and contemporary, Western and non-Western readings. This book includes the standard topics for traditional philosophy of religion courses, as well as ample material for courses incorporating a more global approach. The text also provides abundant pedagogical support for both instructors and stiudents new to the study of non-Western philosophies of religion. It includes such features as an introductory chapter on world religions, introductions to each (...) reading, study questions, glossary, pronunciation guide, and suggested readings. --. (shrink)

One of the hallmarks of human cognition is the capacity to generalize over arbitrary constituents. Recently, Marcus (1998, 1998a, b; Cognition 66, p. 153; Cognitive Psychology 37, p. 243) argued that this capacity, called universal generalization (universality), is not supported by Connectionist models. Instead, universality is best explained by Classical symbol systems, with Connectionism as its implementation. Here it is argued that universality is also a problem for Classicism in that the syntax-sensitive rules that are supposed to provide causal explanations (...) of mental processes are either too strict, precluding possible generalizations; or too lax, providing no information as to the appropriate alternative. Consequently, universality is not explained by a Classical theory. (shrink)

This article examines the impact of law and policy changes enacted in times of crisis on asylum seekers, and considers the extent to which considerations of vulnerability have played a part in the various approaches of governments. What emerges is a shift towards further exclusion, and a widening divide between how states approach citizens versus others. The result is enhanced vulnerability, and an environment in which the utility of the vulnerability concept to provide the necessary levels of support and protection (...) is tested. By looking at how vulnerability is used by states, and contrasting this use with how the concept is often used by other community actors, the article asks what role the concept of vulnerability might play in the effects of crises on vulnerable groups and the priorities and actions of states. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to Vaidya, Guhe, and Williams on the Bloomsbury Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇi of GaṅgeśaStephen Phillips (bio)More or less happy with the reviews, I would like mainly, in response, to identify advances made in the study of Gaṅgeśa. Anand Vaidya articulates a clearer overview of Gaṅgeśa's theory of knowledge; Eberhard Guhe shows a better way to render the notion of vyāpti, "pervasion," which is central in the theory (...) of inference as a knowledge source; and Michael Williams, too, shows need for improvement on that score as well as for elaboration of matters taken up by classical commentators that are given short shrift in my running comments. For example, whereas long discussions are provoked by Gaṅgeśa's definition of "knowledge," pramā, major points in the purvapakṣa in the section on proving the existence of an īśvara, a "Lord," seem, as Williams says, "threadbare."Vaidya, following Burge (2003), introduces a distinction between entitlement and justification: entitlement is the kind of unreflective epistemic warrant delivered by Gaṅgeśa's pramāṇa, "knowledge sources," working automatically in our everyday lives, whereas justification requires self-conscious certification, prāmāṇya-jñapti. Thereby splitting the horns of a dilemma posed by internalist accounts of knowledge in opposition to externalist ones, Burge and Vaidya are able to incorporate the most [End Page 519] attractive features of each approach. The entitlement/justification distinction cashes out, I may add, to Vaidya's elucidation, Nyāya's deeply held doctrine of parataḥ-prāmāṇya, "certification by another," against the view of "intrinsic certification," svataḥ-prāmāṇya, of Prabhākara and others. As Williams notes, Prābhākara positions, for which Gaṅgeśa sometimes shows sympathy, may have led him to presume that an anubhava—"awareness" or "presentational experience" in my translation, "fresh news" in Matilal's snappy rendering—is an episode of knowledge, pramā, "unless one knows otherwise," bādhakam vinā.On reflection, one sees that such a presentation (it could be perceptual, inferential, analogical, or testimonial) has been produced by a pramāṇa, or, in abnormal cases, not, and so by a "pramāṇa-pretender," a pramāṇaābhāsa, as in seeing a mirage. Again, an anubhava is not just any old cognition or "thought" (pace Das 2021, p. 162); it is defined as nonrecollective. Unlike a deliverance of a genuine pramāṇa, some instances may, on examination, prove to be a-pramā, "non-knowledge," but are, nevertheless, at the animal level, sufficient to provoke and guide action that would not be unhesitating were there doubt in any way. A thirsty Maya, in Vaidya's example, would naturally move in the direction of the water she "sees." But she would hesitate were she to learn from her friend about the unreliability of water-perception in the current circumstances. At the reflective level, where she is unsure whether the anubhava she apperceives is pramā or apramā, her action, including speech (implying assertability), is altered.So far so good in Vaidya's reconstruction. But Gaṅgeśa does not himself pronounce on the question of whether, after learning about the defeater, Maya would still be entitled to her perceptual belief that there is water in the distance. In the volumes under review, I assumed that she would not be "justified" and indeed that she would no longer have the belief (if we may speak about "beliefs"). The defeater grasped at the reflective level would mean not only that she could not certify the perceptual deliverance but also that there would be no knowledge. Clearly, she can't certify it, and thus, as Vaidya reasons, loses the right to assert. But maybe he's correct that, according to Gaṅgeśa's sensibilities, she does not lose the perceptual knowledge. She would remain entitled to her belief.Personally, I think this is wrong, but Vaidya's understanding does have the merit of explaining why some later Naiyāyikas apparently took absurd positions on epistemic luck (Bhattacharya 1996, p. ix). I think that Maya would lose her entitlement, too, but what if, after being informed of the unreliability of water-perception... (shrink)

The great Advaita Vedāntin Śaṅkara puts forth a mystic parallelism thesis that is identified and examined here: mystical and sensory experiences are epistemically parallel. Among the conclusions drawn are that the Advaita metaphysics precludes successful defense of a Brahman-centered philosophy on the basis of such a thesis because Advaita precludes a story about how the experience of its Brahman could arise. Thus Śaṅkara needs "scripture" (śruti) to secure important parts of his view. A truly mystical Vedānta, in contrast, would not.

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the concept of solidarity has been invoked frequently. Much interest has centred around how citizens and communities support one another during times of uncertainty. Yet, empirical research which accounts and understands citizen’s views on pandemic solidarity, or their actual practices has remained limited. Drawing upon the analysis of data from 35 qualitative interviews, this article investigates how residents in England and Scotland enacted, understood, or criticised (the lack of) solidarity during the first national lockdown in the (...) United Kingdom in April 2020—at a time when media celebrated solidarity as being at an all-time high. It finds that although solidarity was practiced by some people, the perceived lack of solidarity was just as pronounced. We conclude that despite frequent mobilisations of solidarity by policy makers and other public actors, actual practices of solidarity are poorly understood—despite the importance of solidarity for public health and policy. (shrink)